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Abstract: This study examines implications of “scienter disclosure” through an analysis of 
voluntary disclosures regarding insiders’ Rule 10b5-1 trading plans. Prior theory suggests that 
disclosing informed traders’ intent to trade is not strategically advantageous, but this theory 
does not account for litigation risk reduction resulting from disclosure. Legal precedent 
regarding Rule 10b5-1 affords legal risk reduction to disclosure, therefore voluntary disclosure 
offers an interesting theoretical test.  Evidence indicates that Rule 10b5-1 disclosure increases 
with firm litigation risk and insider strategic trade potential.  Evidence also indicates that Rule 
10b5-1 disclosure is associated with greater abnormal returns to insiders’ trades, especially for 
firms disclosing specific plan details.  This evidence suggests that legal risk can compel firms 
to depart from a non-disclosure strategy and that disclosure might enhance strategic trade.  
Evidence also suggests that non-disclosing firms are least associated with strategic trade; 
therefore proposed mandatory Rule 10b5-1 disclosure might not mitigate strategic behavior. 
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Introduction 
 
A clear inference from prior theoretical research is that firm insiders with private 
information about firm performance would garner no strategic advantage by disclosing 
either their information or their intention to act on their information in advance of actually 
acting on it (Baiman and Verrecchia, 1996; Huddart, Hughes and Williams, 2004).  This 
research, however, characteristically ignores the reduction in litigation risk associated with 
disclosures in advance of any insider wrongdoing.  When disclosure has the potential to 
reduce litigation risk, firms and/or firm insiders trade off litigation risk reduction against 
the loss in strategic advantage that results from greater transparency, in choosing an 
optimal disclosure policy.  We refer to the voluntary disclosure of either information or the 
intention to act on the information in advance of acting on it as “scienter disclosure.”  In 
other words, scienter disclosure describes disclosure that attempts to mitigate litigation 
risks associated with any potential wrongdoing.    
This study posits that the disclosure of insiders’ participation within Rule 10b5-1 
trading plans is an example of scienter disclosure, and examines the determinants and 
implications of firms’ decisions to disclose these plans.  The Rule 10b5-1 setting offers a 
natural opportunity to investigate the influence of litigation risk on insiders’ propensity to 
disclose private information, because legal precedent indicates that Rule 10b5-1 
participation disclosure provides clear, legal risk-reduction benefits.   
Rule 10b5-1 enables insiders to diversify firm-specific holdings with reduced legal 
risk if they plan trades while not in possession of material nonpublic information.  Despite 
an April 2002 proposal to mandate 8-K disclosure of insiders’ participation in the Rule, the 
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SEC currently does not require public reporting of insiders’ trade plans.1 Many firms, 
however, opt to voluntarily disclose information regarding insiders’ participation within 
Rule 10b5-1 trading plans.  This disclosure choice is interesting because one would not 
expect pre-trade voluntary disclosure when there is potential for strategic trade within 
10b5-1 plans (Jagolinzer, 2008) and the disclosure may reveal privately held information.  
It is possible, however, that pre-disclosure of trade may be strategic in the face of high 
legal risk if it mitigates legal risk and does not fully reveal privately held information.   
Our evidence indicates that voluntary Rule 10b5-1 disclosure is associated with the 
level of firm legal risk and a proxy for insiders’ potential strategic trade.  Our evidence also 
indicates that Rule 10b5-1 disclosure is associated with greater abnormal returns to 
insiders’ trades, especially for firms disclosing specific plan details.  Finally, our evidence 
indicates that investors do not respond negatively to Rule 10b5-1 participation disclosure.  
Collectively, our work has three salient implications for voluntary disclosure: 1) litigation 
risk can play a key role in the propensity to disclose information prior to strategic trade; 2) 
Rule 10b5-1 participation disclosure does not fully reveal insiders’ private information; and 
3) disclosure in this setting may actually enhance insiders’ strategic trade opportunities, 
which is seemingly inconsistent with the SEC’s intent for the Rule. 
These findings have important implications with regard to the link between 
voluntary disclosure and litigation risk.  A large body of accounting research has 
investigated managers’ incentives to voluntary disclose information when facing high 
litigation risk (e.g., Skinner, 1994; Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper, 1994; Kasznik and 
Lev, 1995; Skinner, 1997; Baginski, Hassell, and Kimbrough, 2002; Field, Lowry, and 
Shu, 2005; Rogers and Van Buskirk, 2008).  The literature does not consider, however, 
                                                 
1 SEC Release No. 33-8090, Proposed Rule: Form 8-K Disclosure of Certain Management Transactions. 
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managers’ incentives to voluntary disclose information prior to strategic trade.   Our study 
is significant, therefore, because it provides the first evidence that firms and/or firm 
insiders trade off the benefit of litigation risk reduction against the loss of strategic trading 
opportunities as a result of greater transparency when choosing an optimal disclosure 
policy.    
These findings also have important implications regarding Rule 10b5-1 governance.  
Courts, for example, might more carefully consider whether 10b5-1 disclosure mitigates 
scienter, because strategic trade appears to be associated with enhanced disclosure.  The 
SEC should also consider that a mandate to disclose 10b5-1 participation might not 
mitigate strategic trade within the Rule.  If evidence in this study is reflective of Rule 10b5-
1 use, then firms that currently do not disclose participation (i.e., those most apt to be 
affected by a disclosure mandate) are likely those that already have the lowest potential for 
insiders’ strategic trade. 
The study proceeds as follows.  Section 1 provides background information 
regarding Rule 10b5-1 and outlines expectations regarding disclosure choice determinants 
and implications.  Section 2 outlines sample selection procedures.  Section 3 outlines 
empirical tests and results.  Finally, section 4 summarizes results and discusses potential 
governance implications. 
1.  Rule 10b5-1 background, disclosure choice, and disclosure implications 
1.1. Rule 10b5-1 background 
U.S. corporate insiders face legal risk (both civil and criminal) when trading their 
firms’ securities because they frequently possess material nonpublic (or “inside”) 
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information about pending future firm performance and it is generally unlawful to trade 
without first disclosing this information.2    
The SEC promulgated Rule 10b5-1 in October, 2000, in part, to provide a vehicle 
through which insiders could more readily diversify their firm-specific holdings.3  The 
Rule provides an affirmative defense that reduces trade-related litigation risk for insiders 
who enter into trade plans when they do not possess material nonpublic information.  This 
affirmative defense allows more trade flexibility because it absolves insiders from having 
to cancel pre-planned trades or disclose subsequently obtained material nonpublic 
information before pre-planned trades execute.  
Rule 10b5-1’s guidance suggests that regulators expect uninformed diversification 
trade from insiders’ trade plans.  Specifically, the Rule applies if the insider can show that 
“before becoming aware of the information” the insider:  (1) “entered into a binding 
contract to purchase or sell the security; instructed another person to purchase or sell the 
security for the [insider’s] account, or adopted a written plan for trading securities”;  (2) put 
in the plan “. . . the amount of securities to be purchased or sold and the price at which and 
the date on which the securities were to be purchased or sold; . . . a written formula or 
algorithm . . . for determining the amount of securities to be purchased or sold and the price 
at which and the date on which the securities were to be purchased or sold; or [did] not 
permit the [insider] to exercise any subsequent influence over [transactions]”; and (3) did 
not “alter[] or deviate[] from the contract, instruction, or plan to purchase or sell securities 
(whether by changing the amount, price, or timing of the purchase or sale), or enter[] into 
                                                 
2 See Bainbridge (2000) for a detailed discussion regarding insider trading law.   
3 Linda Chatman Thomsen, SEC Director, Division of Enforcement stated recently that “the idea [of Rule 
10b5-1] was to give executives opportunities to diversify or become more liquid through the use of plans with 
prearranged trades without facing the prospect of an insider trading investigation.” (Speech by SEC Staff: 
Opening Remarks Before the 15th Annual NASPP Conference, October 10, 2007). 
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or altered a corresponding or hedging transaction or position with respect to those 
securities.”4
There is evidence, however, that Rule 10b5-1 may provide insiders with strategic 
trade opportunities that generate abnormal trade returns.5  Insiders may, for example, pre-
plan trade based on longer-term nonpublic information because of perceived lower legal 
risk.6   Insiders may also strategically modify the content or timing of disclosure to 
increase profitability of previously planned trades.7  Finally, insiders may also terminate 
Rule 10b5-1 plans when they possess material nonpublic information that indicates that a 
hold strategy would be more profitable than allowing pre-planned sales to continue.8  
Jagolinzer (2008) shows that insiders’ 10b5-1 sales are, on average, associated with 
declines in future firm performance, suggesting there is some strategic behavior within 
Rule 10b5-1. 
1.2. Disclosure choice 
In April, 2002, The SEC proposed mandatory disclosure, through 8-K filings, of 
insiders’ use of Rule 10b5-1 trading plans.9  Specifically, the proposal suggested disclosure 
of the name and title of the director or executive officer, the date on which the director or 
                                                 
4 17 CFR § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(C). 
5 This contrasts the affect of other insider trade regulation and case law that has been shown to mitigate the 
degree to which insiders’ time strategic trade [Seyhun (1992) and Garfinkel (1997)]. 
6 Insiders may perceive lower legal risk when initiating plans while in possession of long term nonpublic 
information because the possession standard is applied at the plan initiation date.  It is likely more difficult 
for plaintiffs to demonstrate possession as the distance grows between the plan initiation date and the 
information revelation date. 
7 Aboody and Kasznik (2000) provide evidence that disclosures are strategically timed to minimize new 
option grant strike prices. 
8 Abstaining from trade while in possession of material nonpublic information is not deemed unlawful [see 
Fried (2003) for a policy discussion].  Therefore, terminating a plan while in possession of material nonpublic 
information is not deemed unlawful [SEC Division of Corporation Finance, Manual of Publicly Available 
Telephone Interpretations, Fourth Supplement, Rule 10b5-1, Question 15 (issued May 2001)].  The argument 
is based on a limit in the statute that fraud be “in connection with the purchase or sale of a security,” and 
since there is neither when a plan is terminated, there is no securities fraud.  The SEC did suggest, however, 
that early plan termination might raise questions about the good faith of the plan. 
9 SEC Release No. 33-8090, Proposed Rule: Form 8-K Disclosure of Certain Management Transactions. 
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executive officer entered into the 10b5-1 plan, and a description of the contract, including 
duration, the aggregate number of securities to be purchased or sold, and the name of the 
counterparty or agent.   The proposal also suggested disclosure if the director or executive 
officer later terminated or modified a plan.10  The proposal was tabled indefinitely, so there 
is currently no requirement for firms or insiders to provide detail regarding whether or how 
they participate within their trading plans.  Many firms, however, choose to disclose 
information regarding insiders’ trade plans and there is substantive variation in disclosure 
detail regarding insiders’ trade plan structures.  These disclosure choices are inherently 
interesting because they potentially offer insight into firms’ and insiders’ utilization of the 
Rule.    
Firms likely disclose Rule 10b5-1 details to reduce legal risk.  The affirmative 
defense provides some risk reduction without disclosure; however, disclosure can further 
enhance legal protection by increasing the likelihood of early dismissal for securities class 
action suits.  Private class action suits represent a major component of firms’ overall legal 
risk.  If sued, firms face potentially large defense and settlement costs.11  Since class action 
lawsuits can be “won” or “lost” at the motion to dismiss phase of litigation, firms have 
incentives to utilize methods, such as 10b5-1 disclosure, that enhance the likelihood of 
dismissal.  
                                                 
10 Specifically, firms would disclose the date of the termination or modification and a description of the 
modification, including duration, the aggregate number of securities to be purchased or sold, the interval at 
which securities are to be purchased or sold, the number of securities to be purchased or sold in each interval, 
the price at which securities are to be purchased or sold, and the identity of the counterparty or agent. 
11 “[C]ompanies are paying the legal costs of…executives defending themselves against fraud allegations.  
The amount of money being paid…totals hundreds of millions, or even billions of dollars.  A company’s 
average cost of defending against shareholder suits last year was $2.2 million according to Tillinghast-
Towers Perrin.”  Laurie P. Cohen, “Adding Insult to Injury: Firms Pay Wrongdoers’ Legal Fees”, The Wall 
Street Journal, February 17, 2004.  Average firm settlements are approximately $30 million per suit.  More 
than ten suits settled between $300 million and $6 billion in 2005 alone (PWC 2005; Buckberg 2005). 
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To dismiss suits involving insider trading allegations, firms may present evidence 
of Rule 10b5-1 trading plans as an affirmative defense. At the motion to dismiss phase, 
however, only previously disclosed plans are admissible because courts do not consider 
materials other than the plaintiff’s pleadings when considering the motion, and defendants 
are not typically allowed to rebut factual allegations.12 Courts may, however, consider 
publicly available documents that are not a part of the complaint, for example, taking 
judicial notice of SEC filings, prospectuses, analysts’ reports, and other publicly reported 
data.13   Therefore, a publicly disclosed 10b5-1 plan has a greater likelihood of influencing 
a motion to dismiss than a plan that is not publicly disclosed.14  This view is shared by 
corporate advisors.  For example, Institutional Shareholder Services, the largest proxy 
advising firm for institutional shareholders, concludes, “such plans should be filed in some 
form with the SEC so that [they] . . . can be considered at the motion to dismiss stage.”15  
Lawyers advising firms on securities fraud litigation matters also think disclosure is a 
prerequisite to risk reduction: “[t]he adoption of the Rule 10b5-1 trading plans . . . should 
                                                 
12 See, e.g., Weiner v. Klais & Co., 108 F.3d 86, 88-89 (6th Cir.1997). 
13 See, e.g., In re Royal Appliance Sec. Litig., 1995 WL 490131, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug.15, 1995). 
14 Precedent cases suggest that disclosure is needed to mount a defense at the motion to dismiss stage.  For 
example, Fener v. Belo Corp.425 F.Supp.2d 788 (N.D. Tex. 2006) notes that plaintiffs have an obligation to 
address in their complaint whether a trading plan was in effect, and if so, “why . . . this does not undercut a 
strong inference of scienter.”  Friedman v. Rayovac Corp., 291 F. Supp. 2d 845 (WD. Wis. 2003) notes that it 
would generally not consider the trading plan or any other document appended to the motion to dismiss, but it 
would in this case since the plan was “publicly available on the SEC's website and was filed as an exhibit to 
numerous reports Rayovac filed with the SEC.”  In re Netflix, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2005 WL 1562858 (N.D. Cal. 
June 28, 2005) and Weitschner v. Monterey Pasta Company, 2003 WL 22889372, No. C 03-0632 (N.D. Cal. 
Nov. 4, 2003) the courts consider publicly disclosed trading plans at the motion to dismiss stage to find no 
strong inference of scienter.  S.E.C. v. Healthsouth Corp., 261 F.Supp.2d 1298, 1322-3 (N.D.Ala., 2003) 
notes the existence and disclosure of a trading plan to rebut the SEC’s allegations of the requisite scienter for 
securities fraud. 
15 See White, T., “More on Trading Plans/Restrictions and Motions to Dismiss: Monterey Pasta Co. and 
Rayovac Corp.” November 24, 2003, RiskMetrics Group, available at 
http://slw.riskmetrics.com/2003/11/more_on_trading_plansrestricti.html (last visited April 7, 2008). 
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be publicly disclosed” to reduce the risk of litigation (Roberts and Porritt, 2004; Siegel and 
Lenahan, 2002).16
Since courts consider publicly available data at the motion to dismiss phase, the 
degree of disclosed detail regarding insiders’ Rule 10b5-1 plans likely impacts the 
probability of dismissal.  If only the existence of a plan is disclosed, a court may not have 
sufficient detail to ascertain whether the insider sufficiently complied with the Rule and 
whether the allegedly fraudulent trades are covered by an existing plan.  If the full plan 
details are disclosed, a court may better ascertain whether the allegedly fraudulent trades 
fall within the Rule’s affirmative defense, thereby increasing the probability of a low-cost 
dismissal. 
The preceding discussion suggests that firms and insiders likely obtain litigation 
benefits from Rule 10b5-1 plan disclosures, and that the benefits are increasing in the 
specificity of the public disclosures.  If so, then one would expect firms with greater ex 
ante litigation risk to be more apt to disclose the existence and details of Rule 10b5-1 plans. 
Insiders bear costs to 10b5-1 disclosures, however, if investors infer a price relevant 
signal from disclosure or if disclosure enhances investors’ monitoring of insiders’ trade 
plan commitment.  If investors infer a price relevant signal from disclosure then disclosure 
may induce investor front-running, which can reduce insiders’ pending trade profitability 
(Huddart, Hughes, and Williams, 2004).17  If disclosure provides investors with insiders’ 
10b5-1 plan details, then it allows for ex post reconciliation of plan commitment.  
Reconciliation would entail matching data reported in insiders’ transaction reports (e.g., 
                                                 
16 “While public disclosure of a trading plan is not required, such disclosure often helps to minimize the 
market impact and negative implications of insider sales.”  (Siegel & Lenahan, 2002). 
17 Counselors and financial advisors suggested in interviews that front-running concerns factored into the 
decision to not disclose or to disclose little detail regarding 10b5-1 participation. 
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SEC Form 4), with details provided with 10b5-1 disclosures.  Reconciliation could reveal 
insiders’ use of the strategic early plan termination option, potentially increasing regulatory 
scrutiny of insiders’ good faith compliance with the Rule.18  Therefore, specific disclosure 
reduces insiders’ value of the early termination option.  Ceteris paribus, then, insiders 
should generally not prefer disclosure; therefore disclosure probability should be lower 
when insiders have more firm control. 
Insiders infer 10b5-1 disclosure benefits, however, if they perceive that disclosure 
provides incremental litigation protection for strategic trade.  If this is the case, then 
insiders’ preference for disclosure should be increasing with their strategic trade potential.   
In models of insiders’ strategic trade (e.g., Kyle 1985; Huddart and Ke 2007), insiders’ 
information advantage is determined by: (1) prior stock price variance and (2) the precision 
of insiders’ private information.  Specifically, low investor uncertainty—i.e., low prior 
stock price variance—provides little scope for profitable insider trade, even if the insider 
possesses perfect private information.  For a given level of private information, then, 
insiders’ strategic trade potential is increasing in prior stock price variance.  If insiders 
infer that disclosure provides litigation protection benefits regarding potential strategic 
trade then disclosure probability should be greater when insiders have more firm control 
and there is higher investor uncertainty.19   
Outside shareholders might infer 10b5-1 disclosure benefits if disclosure provides 
for better monitoring of or greater insider commitment to disclosed trade plans.  Outside 
                                                 
18 The SEC states that “[t]ermination of a plan, or the cancellation of one or more plan transactions, could 
affect the availability of the Rule 10b5-1(c) defense for prior plan transactions  [SEC Division of Corporation 
Finance, Manual of Publicly Available Telephone Interpretations, Fourth Supplement, Rule 10b5-1, Question 
15(b) (issued May 2001)].” 
19 Disclosure probability should also be greater when insiders have more precise private information.  We 
cannot empirically test this prediction since insiders’ private information about pending performance is 
unobservable. 
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shareholders might also infer disclosure benefits if disclosure provides a signal regarding 
insiders’ private information, and provides firm-level litigation protection if insiders trade 
strategically.  These benefits likely increase when insiders have greater strategic trade 
potential, since governance is likely more relevant, insiders’ signals are likely more 
informative, and firm-level litigation risk is likely greater.  If this is the case, then 
disclosure probability should be greater with high outside investor firm control and should 
be even greater when investors concurrently have more uncertainty—i.e., when prior stock 
price variance is high.   
1.3.  Disclosure implications 
1.3.1.  Realized trade and firm performance 
If the probability of Rule 10b5-1 disclosure is increasing in insiders’ strategic trade 
potential, then disclosure should be associated with greater observed strategic trade.  
Strategic trade can be inferred ex post from an association between insiders’ sales 
transactions and subsequent declines in fundamental economic and returns performance.  
Further, if strategic trade litigation protection is increasing in disclosure specificity, then 
the degree of observed strategic trade should also increase with disclosure specificity. 
 Consider, for example, three disclosure groups: non-disclosure, limited disclosure, 
and specific disclosure.  The non-disclosure group likely represents firms that infer low 
litigation, monitoring, plan commitment, or information signal benefits from disclosure 
because insiders have low strategic trade potential.  If this is the case, then this group is 
likely not associated with strategic trade.  The limited disclosure group likely represents 
firms that infer some litigation, monitoring, plan commitment, or information signal 
benefits from disclosure because insiders have some strategic trade potential.  This group 
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would likely contain, for example, insiders who possess less precise private information 
and therefore place greater value in the strategic early termination option.  Limited 
disclosure affords some legal protection, yet still retains the early termination option since 
ex post reconciliation is not feasible.20  If this is the case, then this group is likely 
associated with modest strategic trade.  The specific disclosure group likely represents 
firms that infer substantive litigation, monitoring, plan commitment, or information signal 
benefits from disclosure because insiders have high strategic trade potential.  This group 
would likely contain, for example, insiders who possess more precise private information 
and are therefore less concerned with foregoing the strategic early termination option.  If 
this is the case, then this group is likely associated with the greatest degree of strategic 
trade. 
1.3.2.  Investors’ disclosure response 
If disclosure is associated with insiders’ strategic trade potential, then disclosure 
may provide a price relevant signal to investors.  Investors may respond negatively to 
limited disclosures regarding 10b5-1 participation, for example, if they infer that insiders 
have some strategic trade potential for which they seek litigation protection.  Investors may 
choose to delay their response to limited disclosure, however, if they recognize that the 
participation disclosure implies that insiders’ private information has low precision.  
Investors may choose, instead, to respond when insiders update their private information 
signal with a subsequent sale (Lie, 2005).  Similarly, investors should respond negatively to 
specific disclosures regarding 10b5-1 participation, if they infer that insiders have high 
strategic trade potential for which they seek high litigation protection.    
                                                 
20 Since limited disclosure does not provide sufficient plan detail, one cannot infer, ex post, whether an 
absence of trade results from early termination, non-execution due to failure to meet limit orders, or natural 
plan termination. 
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2.  Sample 
 
The sample of participation disclosures are collected from keyword searches for 
variants of the expression “10b5-1” through 8-K filings, business wire reports, and press 
releases between October 2000 and December 2006.21  This keyword search nets 773 firm 
observations.  Additional disclosure observations are collected from keyword searches for 
variants of the expression “10b5-1” through SEC Form 4 filings between October 2000 and 
December 2006.22  This keyword search nets an additional 894 firm observations.  
Estimation samples are further constrained by the availability of price and returns data 
from CRSP, insider transaction data from Thomson Financial, institutional ownership data 
from CDA/Spectrum, governance data from Equilar, and earnings performance data from 
Compustat.  
Sample disclosures of 10b5-1 plan participation are categorized by each author into 
limited or specific partitions.  If the disclosure delineates the specific terms underlying the 
plan, the disclosure is classified as specific.  Figure 1, Panel A provides one example of a 
disclosure that is classified as specific.  If the disclosure does not delineate the specific 
terms underlying the plan, the disclosure is categorized as limited.  Figure 1, Panel B 
provides two examples of disclosures that are classified as limited.  All Form 4 disclosures 
are classified as limited since they generally state that a particular transaction is Rule 10b5-
                                                 
21 Commonly reported variants of the keyword expression include “10-b-5-1” and “10b5-1(c)”. 
22 The SEC mandated electronic Form 4 filings as of June 30, 2003.  Unlike previously reported paper filings 
(which are available electronically as image scans), the electronic filings enable global keyword searches.  As 
a result, a substantive proportion of the Form 4-generated sample comes from the period subsequent to June 
2003. 
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1 compliant, yet provide no specific details regarding the underlying plan.23  This 
classification procedure yields 94 specific and 1,573 limited firm observations that are 
further constrained for estimation by data availability. 
Some analyses require identifying a sample of firms where insiders’ participation in 
Rule 10b5-1 is not disclosed.24  The non-disclosure sample is inferred from firms where 
there is no Rule 10b5-1 participation disclosure and where insiders execute sales 
transactions within thirty-calendar-day periods that precede quarterly earnings 
announcements.  This inference relies on the assumption that most firms generally blackout 
insiders’ trades before earnings announcements, yet allow Rule 10b5-1 transactions to 
bypass blackout restrictions.25, 26
Firms across disclosure specificity groups appear generally similar in size and 
performance, and are modestly larger and more profitable than the general Compustat 
population during the estimation period.  For example, median market value of equity 
(untabulated) is $625, $745, $603, and $163 million and return on assets is 3%, 4%, 1.3%, 
                                                 
23 Form 4 disclosures may provide different inferences than other participation disclosures since they follow 
trades made within 10b5-1 plans.  Form 4 disclosures are similar to other limited disclosures, however, in that 
they convey that an insider has initiated a plan and that the insider is likely to execute further trade within the 
plan. 
24 Jagolinzer (2008) corroborates the existence of firms that choose to not disclose 10b5-1 plan participation, 
through a survey of nearly 2,700 Nasdaq firms.  Nearly 18% of the 378 respondent firms report that they had 
at least one insider participate within Rule 10b5-1 between October 2000 and December 2002, yet the firm 
chose to not disclose this information. 
25 Jagolinzer, Larcker, and Taylor (2008) report that, from their sample of firm-specific insider trading 
policies, the average blackout window preceding earnings announcements is 45.81 days.  Bettis, Coles, and 
Lemmon (2000) show that fewer than 15% of sample firms authorize insiders’ trades in the 30 days that 
precede earnings announcements.   
26 At least two errors can occur from this inference algorithm.  The first is that the non-disclosure sample does 
not include firms where insiders participate but their transactions are not realized within short proximity to 
earnings announcements.  The second is that the sample includes firms where insiders do not participate but 
their transactions are authorized within short proximity to earnings either because the firm does not constrain 
trade during these windows or because the firm authorizes alternative blackout waivers (e.g., Jagolinzer, 
Larcker, and Taylor (2008) report that some firms authorize the general counsel to grant blackout window 
waivers).  Approximately 19% of the inferred non-disclosure sample shows evidence of insiders’ sales 
transactions within thirty-day windows preceding earnings during the year 2000, before Rule 10b5-1 
promulgation.  This is consistent with alternative blackout waivers.  Results are not sensitive to excluding 
these observations. 
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and 1.4% for the no-disclosure, limited-disclosure, specific-disclosure, and Compustat 
population samples, respectively.   
3. Empirical Analyses 
 
 We are interested in better understanding the determinants and implications of 
voluntary disclosure of 10b5-1 plan participation.  Our empirical tests, therefore, analyze 
firms’ decisions to voluntary disclose participation in 10b5-1 plans, the association 
between voluntary disclosure and subsequent firm returns and earnings performance, and 
investors’ response to disclosure. 
3.1. Disclosure choice 
Our first empirical analysis investigates whether the voluntary disclosure of 10b5-1 
plan participation is more prevalent for firms with high litigation risk and with high 
potential for insiders’ strategic trade.  We investigate firms’ decisions to disclose 
participation within Rule 10b5-1 trading plans using the following logistic regression 
model: 
 
Pr Discl = 1( )= α0 + α1LitRisk + α2InstitOwn + α3InsideDirs + α 4Volat
                 + α5 V olat *InstitOwn⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ + α6 V olat *InsideDirs⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ + ε
 (1) 
where Discl is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the firm discloses Rule 10b5-1 
participation details, and zero otherwise; LitRisk is the firm’s expected class action 
litigation probability estimated in the year prior to 10b5-1 participation disclosure;27 
                                                 
27 Specifically, LitRisk is estimated from the following annual cross-sectional logistic regression (similar to 
Rogers and Stocken, 2005): Pr (DMGPd = 1) = α0 + α1 MinReturn + α2 StdDevReturn + α3 Turnover + α4 
MVE + α5 BHReturn + α6 Beta + α7 BiotechInd + α8 CompHWInd + α9 CompSWInd + α10 ElecInd + α11 
RetailInd + ε, where DMGPd equals one if the fiscal year falls within an alleged class action damage period 
(data provided by Woodruff Sawyer and Co.) and equals zero otherwise; MinReturn is the minimum single 
day firm return during the fiscal year; StdDevReturn is the standard deviation of daily returns during the fiscal 
year; Turnover is the average daily trade volume scaled by shares outstanding during the fiscal year; MVE is 
the average market value of equity during the fiscal year; BHReturn is the prior fiscal year’s buy and hold 
return; Beta is the firm’s beta coefficient from a regression of daily firm returns on daily market returns; and 
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InstitOwn is the percentage of institutional firm ownership (CDA/Spectrum) in the year 
prior to disclosure; InsideDirs is the ratio of officer directors to total board directors in the 
year prior to disclosure (Equilar); and Volat is the standard deviation of residuals from a 
regression of firm daily returns on the daily returns to the value-weighted CRSP portfolio 
in the year prior to disclosure (CRSP). 
If firms expect the net benefit from disclosure to be increasing in the expected 
litigation risk then the coefficient for LitRisk should be positive.  If outside investors expect 
monitoring, plan commitment, litigation, or information signaling benefits from disclosure 
then the coefficient for InstitOwn should be positive.  If insiders expect front-running or 
plan commitment costs from disclosure then the coefficient for InsideDirs should be 
negative.  If firms, insiders, and outside investors expect higher litigation risk benefits from 
disclosure when insiders’ strategic trade potential is greater then the coefficients for Volat, 
[Volat * InstitOwn], and [Volat *InsideDirs] should be positive. 
Equation (1) is estimated using disclosure observations, both specific and limited, 
where the fiscal year is the first year in which disclosure is observed between 2001 and 
2006, and non-disclosure observations where the fiscal year is the first year in which 
inferred Rule 10b5-1 participation is observed between 2001 and 2006.  We estimate 
equation (1) using two specifications.  The first is a logistic regression that includes all 
firm-year observations, which compares the disclosure firms against all non-disclosure 
firms in the initial plan adoption year.  In this specification, we include industry and year 
                                                                                                                                                    
BiotechInd, CompHWInd, CompSWInd, ElecInd, and RetailInd are dichotomous variables that equal one if 
the firm represents the biotechnology, computer hardware, computer software, electric, or retail industries, 
and equal zero otherwise.  For descriptive purposes, pooled estimated coefficients and z-statistics are 
MinReturn (coeff = −4.24, z = −10.78),  StdDevReturn (coeff = −16.56, z = −5.97), Turnover (coeff = 6.42, z = 
6.67), MVE (coeff = −0.01, z = −1.02), BHReturn (coeff = 0.00, z = 1.15), Beta (coeff = 0.67, z = 14.36), 
BiotechInd (coeff = 0.80, z = 5.44), CompHWInd (coeff = 0.75, z = 3.39), CompSWInd (coeff = 0.61, z = 
4.37), ElecInd (coeff = 0.22, z = 1.29), and RetailInd (coeff = 0.57, z = 3.03).  Coefficient estimates differ 
from those reported by Rogers and Stocken (2005) due to some differences in variable measurement. 
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fixed effects to control for prevailing industry and market conditions.  The second is a 
conditional logistic that includes each disclosure observation and a matched non-disclosure 
observation from the same fiscal year, 2-digit industry code, and with the closest market 
value of equity.  This specification potentially reduces the power of the tests, however, it 
better controls for industry and size related factors that might be associated with disclosure 
choice.  
The first two panels of Table 1 report descriptive statistics for the determinants of 
voluntary disclosure of 10b5-1 participation.  Panel B, which reports univariate statistics 
within disclosure groups, provides evidence that voluntary disclosure of plan participation 
is more common for high litigation risk firms.  Specifically, average LitRisk is relatively 
greater for both the specific and limited firms than for the non-disclosure firms (difference 
= 0.009 and 0.007, t-statistics = 4.37 and 12.00, respectively).   Panel B also provides 
evidence that voluntary disclosure of plan participation is more common for high stock 
price volatility firms.  Specifically, average Volat is relatively greater for both the specific 
and limited firms than for the non-disclosure firms (difference = 0.011 and 0.002, t-
statistics = 4.98 and 4.09, respectively).  In addition, average Volat is relatively greater for 
the specific firms than the limited firms (difference = 0.009, t-statistic = 3.86).  
The logistic and conditional logistic estimation results are presented in Panel C of 
Table 1.28  Consistent with evidence reported in Panel B, the results indicate that higher 
litigation risk firms are associated with greater disclosure probability of 10b5-1 plan 
participation (LitRisk coeffs. = 10.009 and 10.471; z-statistics = 3.31 and 2.88).  The results 
also indicate that firms with higher insider strategic trade potential are more likely to 
                                                 
28Volat, InstitOwn and InsideDirs are recentered to their average values (i.e., the average of each variable has 
been subtracted from each variable) to provide interpretation of the main effects at their average value. 
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disclose 10b5-1 participation (Volat coeffs. = 22.189 and 25.143; z-statistics = 5.17 and 
4.45).  This suggests that firms with higher litigation risk expect benefits from disclosure.  
The results also indicate that firms with higher institutional ownership are more likely to 
disclose 10b5-1 plan participation (InstitOwn coeffs. = 1.228 and 0.969; z-statistics = 5.63 
and 3.94) and that this association is stronger when there is higher insider strategic trade 
potential (Volat * InstitOwn coeffs. = 47.975 and 33.789; z-statistics = 4.33 and 2.42).  This 
suggests that institutional investors infer disclosure-related monitoring, plan commitment, 
information signaling, or legal protection benefits.  Results also indicate that officers prefer 
disclosure only when there is higher insider strategic trade potential (Volat * InsideDirs 
coeffs. = 31.625 and 29.043; z-statistics = 2.13 and 1.69).  This suggests that insiders prefer 
greater disclosure to mitigate litigation risk regarding potential strategic trade.   
3.2.  Realized trade and subsequent performance 
 
3.2.1. Returns performance 
 
The next analyses investigate whether Rule 10b5-1 plan participation disclosure is 
associated with realized strategic trade by insiders.  Figure 2 plots the cumulative abnormal 
return relative to the timing of insiders’ sales that are executed after the first disclosure of 
insiders’ participation within the Rule.  Returns analyses focus exclusively on insiders’ 
sales transactions since sales comprise nearly all transactions executed within Rule 10b5-1 
(Jagolinzer, 2008) and because there are no specific disclosure observations associated with 
pending insider purchases.  Specifically, Figure 2 cumulates the market adjusted firm 
returns (daily firm return – the daily return to the value-weighted CRSP portfolio) from day 
– 30 to day + 30 relative to each sales transaction (executed on day 0) during the one-year 
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period that follows the insider’s first participation disclosure.29  For non-disclosure firms, a 
first-pseudo-disclosure date is identified as the sixtieth calendar day that precedes the first 
observed within-blackout-window transaction.30  
Figure 2, Panel A shows that sales trades that follow specific disclosure are 
associated with positive market-adjusted returns preceding the transaction and negative 
market-adjusted returns subsequent to the transaction.  Relatedly, Figure 2, Panel B shows 
that sales trades that follow limited disclosure are also associated with positive market-
adjusted returns preceding the transaction and negative market-adjusted returns subsequent 
to the transaction.  Finally, Figure 2, Panel C shows that sales trades that follow non-
disclosure are associated with positive market-adjusted returns preceding the transaction.  
However, these transactions do not appear to be associated with negative subsequent 
market-adjusted returns.  A comparison of post-trade returns slopes across Figure 2 panels 
suggests that the degree to which sales transactions are associated with negative 
performance is increasing in Rule 10b5-1 disclosure specificity.   
To more formally test the association between trade returns and disclosure 
specificity, Table 2, Panel B presents univariate comparisons of abnormal trade returns 
across disclosure partitions.  Specifically, Table 2 reports insider-specific dollar-weighted 
average buy-and-hold abnormal trade returns for each insider’s sales transactions that 
                                                 
29 For all non-disclosure and most limited disclosure observations, it is not possible to discern the length of 
10b5-1 plans.  A typical disclosed plan length is 12 months, so we assume that trades made within 12 months 
following plan disclosure are pursuant to the Rule.  Misclassification of observed trades likely induces noise 
to inferences regarding the association between trades and performance. 
30 For disclosure firms (excluding Form 4 disclosures), the average number of days between disclosure and 
the first observed trade is 53.  The median number of days is 17.  Results are not sensitive to denoting the 
first-pseudo-disclosure date as the thirtieth calendar day that precedes the first observed within-blackout-
window transaction.  
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execute during the year that follows disclosure.31  Consistent with evidence reported in 
Figure 2, Table 2 Panel B indicates that post-trade abnormal returns become more negative 
as disclosure of participation becomes more specific.  For example, Panel B shows that the 
average six-month post-trade abnormal return is −12.3%, −5.6%, and −0.3% (t-statistics = 
−2.91, −13.56, and −1.00) for specific, limited, and non-disclosed trades, respectively. 
To control for other factors that might explain differences in post-trade returns, 
Table 3 provides evidence from a calendar-month portfolio estimation of monthly returns 
regressed on factors known to explain monthly returns (Fama and French, 1993; Carhart, 
1997).  Our approach follows the portfolio estimation method suggested by Mitchell and 
Stafford (2000), to control for potential contemporaneous cross-sectional correlation.  
Specifically, within each disclosure category, monthly portfolios are formed between 
January 2001 and July 2007 if a 10b5-1 sales transaction is observed in the preceding 
calendar month.  For each calendar month in which at least three firms are available to 
form a portfolio, the following regression is estimated:  
 
 
R port − R f( )= β0 + β1 Rm − R f( )+ β2SMB + β3HML + β4UMD + u  (2) 
where Rport is the equally-weighted monthly portfolio return, Rf is the one-month treasury 
bill rate, Rm is the value-weighted monthly market return, and SMB, HML, and UMD are 
the monthly small-minus-big, high-minus-low, and momentum factors that explain 
monthly stock returns (Fama and French, 1993; Carhart, 1997). 
                                                 
31 Weighted average abnormal returns are computed as 
,)(
1
1
j
J
j J
j j
j VWBHRwBHRw
DollarVol
DollarVol −∑ ∑= =
  where 
DollarVol is the trade dollar volume, BHRw is the trade’s w-month buy and hold return, VWBHRw is the w-
month buy and hold return to the CRSP value-weighted portfolio, and j is a subscript for each trade executed. 
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Consistent with evidence presented in Figure 2 and Table 2, results from Table 3 
indicate that more specific 10b5-1 plan disclosures are associated with more negative post-
trade abnormal returns.  Specifically, abnormal returns to the non-disclosure portfolio 
(0.001, t-statistic = 0.46) from column 1 of Table 3 are not statistically negative.  Abnormal 
returns to the limited-disclosure portfolio (−0.010, t-statistic = −2.25) from column 2 of 
Table 3, however, are statistically negative.  Abnormal returns to the specific-disclosure 
portfolio (−0.047, t-statistic = −2.94) from column 3 are also statistically negative.  Finally, 
column 4 of Table 3 indicates that post-trade abnormal returns are statistically more 
negative as disclosure becomes more specific.  Formal tests comparing portfolio returns 
indicate that post-trade abnormal returns are statistically more negative for the limited-
disclosure portfolio relative to the non-disclosure portfolio (−0.010, t-statistic = −1.86), for 
the specific-disclosure portfolio relative to the non-disclosure portfolio (−0.041, t-statistic = 
−4.08), and for the specific-disclosure portfolio relative to the limited-disclosure portfolio 
(−0.031, t-statistic = −3.04). 
We also present results using a firm-level calendar-time regression for robustness.  
The Mitchell and Stafford (2000) portfolio method can result in relatively low power tests 
due to observation aggregation at the month portfolio level (see Loughran and Ritter 
(2000), Mitchell and Stafford (2000), and Cheng, Nagar, and Rajan (2007) for a 
discussion).   Following Cheng, Nagar and Rajan (2007), the following regression model is 
estimated: 
 
 
R j − Rm( )= δ0 + δ1None + δ2Limited + δ3Specific + δ4Ln (BT M )
            + δ5PriorReturn + δ6 PriorVolatility + z
 (3) 
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where Rj is the monthly firm return, Rm is the equal-weighted or value-weighted monthly 
CRSP portfolio market return, None is a dichotomous variable that equals one during the 
month following a non-disclosed inferred Rule 10b5-1 sales transaction and equals zero 
otherwise, Limited is a dichotomous variable that equals one during the month following a 
limited-disclosed Rule 10b5-1 sales transaction and equals zero otherwise, Specific is a  
dichotomous variable that equals one during the month following a specific-disclosed Rule 
10b5-1 sales transaction and equals zero otherwise, BTM is the book-to-market ratio 
measured at the end of the previous month, PriorReturn is the buy-and-hold firm return 
over the preceding 12 months, and PriorVolatility is the standard deviation of monthly 
stock returns over the preceding 36 months.  We control for common events within 
industries using 2-digit industry code fixed effects.  We also control for potential 
dependency in firm returns within months through the use of month-clustered standard 
errors (Gow, Ormazabal, and Taylor, 2008).32
Consistent with earlier results, Table 4 provides evidence that the association 
between sales transactions and subsequent negative performance is increasing in disclosure 
specificity, after controlling for other factors that are associated with firm returns.  
Specifically, when the dependent variable equals the equal-weighted-market adjusted firm 
monthly return, results indicate that abnormal returns following trade months are 1.2%, 
1.6% and 4.3% lower than returns in other months for non-, limited-, and specific-
disclosure firms, respectively.  When the dependent variable equals the value-weighted-
market adjusted firm monthly return, results indicate that abnormal returns following trade 
                                                 
32 Lakonishok and Lee (2001) provide evidence that abnormal returns accrue to insiders’ sales at firms with 
high book to market ratios and low market value of equity.  This estimation explicitly controls for differences 
in book to market ratios across firms.  Market value of equity is implicitly controlled for because firms in the 
different disclosure partitions are of similar size (untabulated). 
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months are 1.1%, 2.1% and 4.3% lower than returns in other months for non-, limited-, and 
specific-disclosure firms, respectively.  Formal tests indicate that post-trade abnormal 
returns are generally statistically more negative as disclosure specificity increases. 
3.2.2. Earnings and price relevant news  
 
To better understand what may economically underlie the association between 
disclosed Rule 10b5-1 trades and subsequent return performance, Table 5 presents results 
regarding investors’ response to releases of earnings news, both before and after the first 
observed trades that follow voluntary Rule 10b5-1 disclosures.  Specifically, Table 5 
reports three-day market adjusted returns, centered on the quarterly announcement date 
(RDQE from Compustat), for the four quarters that precede and that follow the quarter in 
which the first insider trade is observed following disclosure.  Returns are adjusted by 
subtracting the same period return to the value-weighted CRSP portfolio. 
Table 5 provides evidence of positive earnings announcement surprises for the four 
quarters prior to insiders’ first sales for firms providing limited and specific disclosure 
(pooled t-statistics = 5.57 and 2.24, respectively).  This evidence is consistent with positive 
earnings performance relative to investors’ expectations prior to insiders’ sales.  Table 5 
also provides some evidence of negative earnings announcement surprises for the four 
quarters following insiders’ first sales for firms providing limited disclosure (pooled t-
statistic = −2.23).  This evidence is consistent with overall negative earnings performance 
shifts from the period before to after insiders’ sales.  Evidence for firms providing specific 
disclosure indicates a similar decline in earnings performance across the periods, however, 
there is no evidence of negative post-sales earnings performance perhaps because of low 
power or because specific disclosure trades are associated with price relevant events that 
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may not be impounded in short-term earnings.  To explore this further, we analyze whether 
specific disclosures are associated with subsequent news events that may not be impounded 
in short-term earnings.  We find that approximately 25% of the specific disclosure sample 
exhibits a single news event, not related to earnings, for which the three-day market 
adjusted return falls between −10% and −75%, within an average 140 calendar days of 
disclosure.33  We also find that approximately 33% of the remaining specific disclosure 
sample exhibit sustained returns declines (between –20% and −80%), for which there is no 
obvious associated information event, during the 180 calendar days that follow disclosure,. 
Collectively, this evidence suggests that Rule 10b5-1 trades tend to be associated 
with fundamental firm economic shifts.  This mitigates the likelihood that observed returns 
patterns result from investors’ response to 10b5-1 trade signals. 
3.2.3. Investors’ response to 10b5-1 disclosure 
We assess whether investors respond to 10b5-1 disclosure by estimating three day 
market-adjusted returns centered on the initial participation disclosure date and on the 
subsequent report date for the first trade execution.  We market-adjust returns by 
subtracting the same period return to the value-weighted CRSP portfolio.  Table 6 provides 
evidence regarding returns to initial participation disclosures (Announcement) and to first 
transaction disclosures (Transaction), which represent the transactions’ Form 4 SEC 
reporting date (Thomson Financial).  Results do not indicate that investors respond 
negatively to 10b5-1 disclosure or the disclosure of first trades executed within 10b5-1.  
The lack of negative investor response to 10b5-1 disclosures may indicate that there are 
frictions to implementing strategies based on 10b5-1 disclosure signals or that investors’ do 
                                                 
33 News event examples include exchange-imposed stock trade suspension, drug trial failure, and 
announcement of the intent to acquire another firm. 
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not understand 10b5-1 disclosure implications, which is possible if our sample period 
reflects the transition period regarding 10b5-1 use.34  It may also indicate that the reported 
estimation method is misspecified or has low power. 
 
4. Conclusions 
This study examines implications of “scienter disclosure” through an analysis of 
voluntary disclosures regarding insiders’ Rule 10b5-1 trading plans.  In contrast to theory 
that suggests there is no strategic advantage to disclosing an informed insider’s intent to 
trade (Baiman and Verrecchia, 1996; Huddart, Hughes and Williams, 2004), evidence 
suggests that disclosure related legal risk mitigation can compel firms to depart from a non-
disclosure strategy.  Specifically, evidence indicates that participation disclosure is 
increasing in firm litigation risk and in insiders’ strategic trade potential, suggesting that 
firms and/or firm insiders infer legal benefits from disclosure.  Evidence also indicates that 
risk-mitigating disclosure may enhance insiders’ strategic trade profit potential.  
Specifically, evidence indicates that disclosed 10b5-1 insiders’ sales transactions are 
associated with fundamental firm economic shifts that relate to significant declines in 
returns performance.  Evidence also indicates that post-trade returns performance declines 
are increasing in disclosure specificity.  Collectively, this suggests that 10b5-1 disclosure 
may provide legal protection for strategic trade, which is seemingly inconsistent with 
regulatory intent. 
Several governance implications may be drawn from these results.  First, courts 
might more carefully consider whether 10b5-1 disclosure mitigates scienter, since strategic 
                                                 
34 Anecdotally, some regulators, legal counselors, and institutional investors have noted that they have only 
recently begun to understand the implications of Rule 10b5-1.  Some have noted that their understanding has 
improved with the increasing availability of historical data. 
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trade patterns appear more in firms with enhanced disclosure.  Second, firms should 
consider whether specific disclosure reduces or enhances insiders’ strategic trade options.  
In some cases, it may reduce the value insiders’ options since it allows for ex post 
revelation of early plan termination.  However, it may enhance the value of other options, 
such as planning trade in anticipation of longer-term negative news, since specific 
disclosure may increase the likelihood of early legal case dismissal.  Finally, the SEC 
should consider that a mandate to disclose 10b5-1 participation might not mitigate strategic 
trade within the Rule.  If evidence in this study is reflective of Rule 10b5-1 use, then firms 
that currently do not disclose participation (i.e., those most apt to be affected by a 
disclosure mandate) are likely those that already have the lowest potential strategic trade.   
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Figure 1 
Example 10b5-1 Plan Disclosures 
 
Panel A: Specific  
 
Excerpts from PepsiAmericas Inc. Form 8-K, Filed March 3, 2005 
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Figure 1 (continued) 
Example 10b5-1 Plan Disclosures 
 
Panel B: Limited  
 
Excerpt from Ariba Inc. Form 8-K, Filed June 16, 2006 
 
 
 
Excerpt from Build-A-Bear Workshop Inc. Form 8-K, Filed August 3, 2005 
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Figure 2 
Cumulative abnormal return relative to sales transactions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This figure plots the average cumulative abnormal return relative to insiders’ sales transactions within Rule 
10b5-1.  Each firm’s cumulative abnormal return is computed as CARt = 
t , where Rf is the 
firm’s daily return,RVWCRSP is the daily return to the CRSP value weighted portfolio, and t denotes a specific 
day relative to the transaction date.  Trade-day observations = 1,108 specific, 23,040 limited, and 20,818 non-
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Panel C.  Non-disclosure sales
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Table 1 
Disclosure of 10b5-1 plan participation determinants 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
           
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. 25% 50% 75%
           
LitRisk  0.014 0.017 0.006 0.009 0.015
InsideDirs  0.363 0.167 0.242 0.353 0.460
InstitOwn  0.497 0.272 0.263 0.521 0.727
Volat  0.029 0.017 0.017 0.024 0.036
 
Panel B. Statistics by disclosure type 
           
Variable  None Lim Spc Spc - None Lim - None Spc - Lim
             
  Mean Mean Mean Mean(t-stat)
Mean
(t-stat)
Mean
(t-stat)
             
LitRisk  0.013 0.020 0.022 0.009(4.37)
0.007 
(12.00)
0.002 
(0.85)
             
InsideDirs  0.366 0.354 0.372 0.006 (0.30)
−0.012 
(−2.09)
0.018 
(0.83)
             
InstitOwn  0.472 0.583 0.532 0.060 (1.62)
0.111 
(11.80)
−0.051 
(−1.40)
             
Volat  0.027 0.029 0.038 0.011 (4.98)
0.002 
(4.09)
0.009 
(3.86)
Table 1 continued 
Disclosure of 10b5-1 plan participation determinants 
 
Panel C: Logistic regression 
    Matched Sample
    
  Pr(Discl = 1) 
       
 Full
 
 Sample
  
Variable  Exp. Sign Coeff. (z-stat)  
Coeff.
(z-stat)
       
LitRisk 
  
9 
)  
10.471 
(2.88)
     
InstitOwn 
  
+ 
 
1.228 
(5.63)  
0.969 
(3.94)
       
InsideDirs 
  
− 
 
−0.214 
−   
−0.337 
(−1.11)
     
Volat  9 )  
25.143 
(4.45)
       
Volat * InstitOw
  
+ 
 
47.975 
(4.33)  
33.789 
(2.42)
       
Volat * InsideDirs  +  
31.625 
(2.13)  
29.043 
(1.69)
     
    
     
Fixed Effects   Industry, Year  Match-pair
Num obs None   3,652  1,078
Num obs Sp  57  57
N  Li  055  1,021
Pseudo R2  211  0.049
+ 
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Th le provides summary statistics (Panel A), univariate comparisons (Panel B), and logistic regressions 
(Pa ) of th rms’ d to s ci  i 5-1 plans.  Comparisons are 
ma  the ye or di firm d i  fir ar ferred 10b5-1 trade for non-
dis ng firms.  Panel C provides results fro stim g:  Dis 1) + α1 LitRisk + α2 InstitOwn 
+ ideDirs + α4 Volat + α5 Volat * InstitOwn + α6 Volat * InsideDirs + +ε, where Discl is a 
dic mous variable that equals f the firm discloses Rule 10b5-1 participation details, and zero 
oth se; LitRisk is the firm’s expected class action litigation probability estimated in the year prior to 10b5-
1 p ipation disclosure; InstitOwn e percentage of institutional firm ownership (CDA/Spectrum) in the 
ye or isclosure; InsideDirs i  of officer directors to total board directors in the year prior to 
dis re uilar); and Volat is the dard deviation of residuals from a regression of daily firm returns on 
da lu ighted CRSP portfolio rns in the year prior to disclosure (CRSP).  LitRisk is estimated from 
the w annual cross-sectional stic regression [similar to Rogers and Stocken (2005)]: Pr (DMGPd 
= 1) = α α1 MinReturn + α2 St Return + α3 Turnover + α4 MVE + α5 BHReturn + α6 Beta + α7 
Bio In α8 CompHWInd + α9 C SWInd + α10 ElecInd + α11 RetailInd + ε, where DMGPd equals one 
if sc ar falls within an alle lass action damage period (data provided by Woodruff Sawyer and 
Co d ro e; Mi is the minimum gle  firm return during the fiscal year; 
e iat ily retur uri e fiscal year; Turnover is the average daily 
lu sta ring the al y MV  th rage market value of equity 
th  i or fisca r’s  an old rn; Beta is the firm’s beta 
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ssion of daily firm returns on daily market returns; and BiotechInd, CompHWInd, 
at equal one if the firm represents the 
ail industries, and equal zero otherwise.  
stic regression results using all available observations and fixed industry 
an l C presents conditional logistic regression results for the sample where 
e h disclosure firm is matched with a non-disclosure rm from the s  d
closest market value of equity.   
coefficient from a regre
CompSWInd, ElecInd, and RetailInd are dichotomous variables th
iotechnology, computer hardware, computer software, electric, or retb
Column 1 of Panel C presents logi
d year effects.  Column 2 of Pane
ac  fi ame year, same 2- igit industry, and 
Table 2 
Weighted average abnormal returns 
 
Panel A. Insider specific statistics by disclosure type 
          
Variable  None Lim Spc Spc - None Lim - None
            
 
Spc - Lim
 
  Mean Mean Mean Mean(t-stat)
Mean
(t-stat)
            
Mean
(t-stat)
 
Cumulative Sales ($M)  6.589 8.206 5.618 −0.971(−0.39)
1.617 
(1.62)
            
Transaction Days  4.878 10.720 25.065 20.187 (3.59)
5.843 
(16.54)
            
CEO  0.126 0.240 0.541 0.415 (6.43)
0.114 
(13.57)
           
CFO  0.079 0.126 0.148 0.069 (1.50)
0.047 
(7.13)
            
President  0.129 0.220 0.443 0.314 (4.88)
0.091 
(10.89)
            
Director  0.559 0.471 0.820 0.261 (4.09)
−0.088 
(−7.73)
            
Chairman  0.096 0.149 0.410 0.314
−2.588 
(−1.01)
 
14.345 
(5.84)
 
0.301 
(5.44)
  
0.022 
(0.47)
 
0.223 
(4.15)
 
0.349 
(5.42)
  
(4.93) 
0.053 
(7.26) 
0.261 
(5.62) 
             
Officer  0.724 0.874 0.836 0.112 (1.95) 
0.150 
(16.21) (
            
Num Insiders  5,362 3,049 61   
Num Firms  1,833 1,199 49   
−0.038 
−0.89) 
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Table 2 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Weighted Average Abnormal Returns 
         
Ho Spc Lim – None Spc – None Spc - Lim
    
rizon Statistic None  Lim
    
6-m ders 4,94  2
 Firms 1,736  1
    
 Mean −0.003 −1.00)  
−0.056 
(−1
−0.123 
(−
−0 053 
72)
−
(−
−
(−
    
 −0.003  (0.027)  
−0 47 −
(0
−
(
    
o Insi 6 ,921 60 
,151 47 
(t-statistic)  ( 3.56) 2.91)
.
(−9.
0.120 
2.82)
0.067 
4.53)
Median 
(p-value) 
.050 
(0.000)
−0.074 
(0.002) 
−0.0
(0.000)
0.071 
.001)
0.024 
0.027)
3-m  Insiders 5,18  60 
 Firms 1,794  1,177 47 
    
 Mean atistic) 
−0.004 
 (−1.68)  
−0.036 
(−1
−0.082 
(−
−0.032 
73)
−0
(−2
−
(−
  
 Median value) 
−0.003 
 (0.039)  
−0.024 
(−0
−0.024 
(0
−0 021 
00)
−0
(0. (
    
o 6 2,982
(t-st
  
3.32) 2.41) (−8.
.078 
.29)
0.046 
2.29)
(p- .000) .030) 
.
(0.0
.021 
020)
0.000 
0.154)
1-m ers 5,362  3
s 1,833  49 
    
 Mean (t-statistic) 
−0.006 
 (−5.11)  
−
(−10.94)
−
(−3.32)
0.008 
(-4.18)
−0
(−
−
(
  
  −0.003  (0.000)  
−0 − 005 −0.012 
(0.011)
−0.007 
(0.043)
o Insid
 Firm
,049
1,199
61 
0.014 0.058 − .052 
2.95)
0.044 
−2.26)
  
anMedi
(p-value) 
.008 
(0.000)
0.015 
(0.005) 
−0.
(0.000)
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ummary statistics (Panel A) and dollar volume-weighted average sales trade returns (Panel B) for insiders within specified disclosure 
.  Cumulative sales volume is the dollar volume of sales (in millions) during the one-year period that follows the first observed 
isclosure between 2001 and 2006.  Transaction days is the number of sales transaction days during the one-year period that follows the first observed 
President, Director, Chairman, and Officer are dichotomous variables that equal one if the insider holds 
the resp tive position title and equa z o otherwise.  ighted av normal return mputed as 
,)(
j
j BH
DollarVol
This table provides s
classification groups
d
disclosure between 2001 and 2006. CEO, CFO, 
ec l er We erage ab s are co
1
1
jj J
j
VWBHRwRw
DollarVol −∑ ∑= =
  where 
DollarV l is the trade dollar volu e BHRw is the trade’s w-month buy and hold return, VWBHRw is the w-month buy and hold return to the CRSP 
ue-w rtfolio, a su scr de exec
***, ** te significan , 5- percent level (2-tailed), respectively.  Significance for the medians is derived from the Kruskal-Wallis 
test. 
J
o m , 
val eighted po nd j is a b ipt for each tra uted. 
, * deno ce at the 1- and 10-
 
Table 3 
 ti p olio returns 
Rport – Rf 
Calendar me 
 
 
ortf
None 0.001 
(0.46)
−0.002 
(−0.26) 
 
Limited
 
Specifi
 
Rm -Rf 
 
SMB 
 
HML 
 
UMD 
 
 
Coefficien om
 
 
Limited – None 
 
Specific – None 
 
Specific – imited
 
None Month-Obs
 
  −0.010 
(−2.25)
−0.012 
(−1.86) 
 
c −0.047 
(−2.94)
−0.043 
(−5.27) 
 
1.036 
(21.33)
1.394 
(9.53)
1.088 
(2.13)
1.242 
(9.42) 
 
0.574 
(10.70)
0.753 
(4.93)
1.477 
(3.12)
0.859 
(6.21) 
 
0.195 
(3.00)
0.027 
(0.15)
0.387 
(0.59)
0.225 
(1.33) 
 
0.172 
(4.56)
0.025 
(0.20)
−0.359 
(−0.81)
0.022 
(0.20) 
 
t C p ons   
  
−0.010 
(−1.86) 
 
−0.041 
(−4.08) 
 
 L −0.031 
(−3.04) 
 
72  
aris
 
 
Limited M nth-O
Specific M nth-O
Adj R2 
o 71  
o 45  
0.871 0.793 0.429 0.589 
bs 
bs 
 
This table p ides r
+ β4 UMD + , wher
if an insider itiates
month treas  bill r
UMD are t month
Fama and F ch (19
month to fo  a port
rov s from a regression of (Rport – Rf) = β0 + β1 (Rm – Rf) + β2 SMB + β3 HML 
 u  is the equally-weighted monthly return to a portfolio of firms selected 
 in les transaction within Rule 10b5-1 in the preceding month, Rf is the one-
ury  Rm is the value-weighted monthly market return, and SMB, HML, and 
he mall-minus-big, high-minus-low, and momentum factors discussed in 
ren  and Carhart (1997).  At least 3 firms must be present in each calendar-
rm
esult
e Rport
 a sa
ate,
ly s
93)
folio. 
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Table 4 
 time returns 
 Rj – Rm(ew) Rj – Rm(vw) 
Calendar
 
   
None −0.012 (−5.41)  
   
imited  −0.016 .58)  
  
pecific .043 (−3.67)
 
(−3.54) 
 
Ln(BTM) 
−0.0
(−12.0
 
 
  
eturn 003.60
 
 
olatility 6 .14
 
 
  
ept 0.019 .38
0.011  
 
 
ient Comparisons 
  
ne .0(−1.35)
 
(−2.97) 
  
−0.031
(−2.63)
−0.032
  
Specific – Limited −0.027 (−2.34)
 
(
  
−0.011 
(−4.18)
L (−7
−0.021 
(−5.61)
 
S −0 −0.043
  
21 
8)
−0.021
(−9.82)
 
PriorR −0.  (−2 )
  
−0.004
(−2.32)
 
PriorV 0.00(0 )
0.02
(0.45)
0
 
Interc
 
−
(−2 )
−
(−1.70)
 
Coeffic
 
Limited – No −0 04 −0.010
 
Specific – None   (−2.70) 
 
−0.022
−1.81) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fixed Effects 
Std Error Clusters  
Industry  
Month  
  
umber Firms None 1,84  
ited 1,20  
ic 46 
0.013 0.01  
Industry
Month
 
N 0
Number Firms Lim 0
Number Firms Specif
Adj R2 2
 
e provides results from a regression of (R  δ0 one mited  + δ4 
n(BTM) + δ PriorReturn + δ PriorVolatility + z, where R  is the monthly firm return, R  is the 
 
les 
 the 
se, 
 
 at 
nth, PriorReturn is the buy-and-hold firm return over the preceding 12 
months, and PriorVolatility is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the preceding 36 
months.
his tabl j– Rm) =   + δ1 N  + δ2 Li + δ3 SpecificT
L 5 6 j m
equal-weighted or value-weighted monthly CRSP portfolio market return, None is a dichotomous
variable that equals one during the month following a non-disclosed inferred Rule 10b5-1 sa
transaction and equals zero otherwise, Limited is a dichotomous variable that equals one during
month following a limited-disclosed Rule 10b5-1 sales transaction and equals zero otherwi
Specific is a  dichotomous variable that equals one during the month following a specific-disclosed
Rule 10b5-1 sales transaction and equals zero otherwise, BTM is the book-to-market ratio measured
the end of the previous mo
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 Table 5 
Investors’ response to earnings 
 
 
 
 
Thi istics regarding three day market-adjust rns centered arterly earnings 
a E from Compustat).  Firm quarters are selected based on roximity to the 
q er trade is executed following 10b5-1 disclosure (Qtr0) s over the 
t uarterly announcement are adjusted by subtracting the same od return to the 
v ghted CRSP portfolio.  Sample reflects 902 limited  disclosure ith data for all 
Limited ific
 
 Spec
    
Qtr Re
to Disc
lative 
losure 
Mean
(t-stat)
an
tat)
   
Me
(t-s
 
Qtr-4 0.008 
(2.49)
30 
16)
   
0.004 
(1.48)
07 
29)
   
0.008 
(3.08)
34 
06)
   
 0.011 
(4.30)
30 
16)
   
 0.003 
(0.92)
02 
12)
   
Qtr  −0.001 
(−0.35)
00 
03)
   
+2 −0.000 
(−0.06)
0.020 
(1.18)
   
+3 −0.005 
(−1.93)
05 
5)
   
+4 −0.006 
(−2.10)
07 
3) 
 
   
0.0
(2.
 
Qtr-3 −0.0
(−0.
 
Qtr-2 0.0
(2.
 
Qtr-1 0.0
(2.
 
Qtr0 −0.0
(−0.
 
+1 −0.0
(−0.
 
Qtr
 
Qtr −0.0
.3(−0
 
Qtr 0.0
(0.6
 
Qtr-4 to Qtr-1 0.008 
(5.57)
024 
(2.24)
   
+1 to Qtr+4 −0.003 
(−2.23)
0.005 
75)
0.
 
Qtr
(0.
s table provides stat
nnouncement dates (RD
ed retu  on q
 their p
u
Q
uarter in which the first insid .  Firm return
hree days centered on the q  peri
alue-wei and 33 firms w
quarters. 
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Table 6 
Investors’ response to disclosure  
vent   Limited  
 
E Specific Specific - Limited
       
Announcement Mean 
(t-statistic) 
 −0.002 
(−0.80)
0.000 
(0.05) 
   
Median 
(p-value) 
 
(
−0.001 
(0.221)
−0.002 
(0.886) 
  
 N 559  
    
−0.002
(−0.18)
 
 
   
−0.003
0.700)
     
63
   
Transaction Mean 
(t-statistic) 
0.003 
(2.17)
−0.008 
(−0.93) 
  
 Median 
(p-value) 
 
(
0.001 
(0.170)
−0.012 
(0.119) 
  
N 1,197  
−0.005 
(−0.62)
 
−0.011
0.267)
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This table provides statistics regard e day market-a returns centered on 
A ent, the Rule 10b5-1 disclosur te, and on Transa e SEC report date for 
t sales transaction subsequent to An ent.  Announcemen ations do not include 
Form 4 disclosures, since the Form 4 disclosures are reflected as  events.  Returns 
d arket adjustments are adjuste tracting the sam return to the value-
weigh  CRSP portfolio. 
 
ing thre djusted 
nnouncem
he first 
e event da
nouncem
ction, th
t observ
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enoting m
ted
d by sub e period 
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